[1]陈 苏.恒产者恒心：民国时期佃农经营能力与其土地合约选择关系的辨析[J].中国农史,2025,(05):51-66.
CHEN Su.A Stake in the Soil Breeds Steadfastness: An Analysis of the Relationship Between Tenants’ Managerial Ability and Land Contract Choice in Republican China[J].AGRICULTURAL HISTORY OF CHINA,2025,(05):51-66.
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恒产者恒心：民国时期佃农经营能力与其土地合约选择关系的辨析(
)
《中国农史》[ISSN:1000-4459/CN:32-1061/S]
- 卷:
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- 期数:
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2025年05期
- 页码:
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51-66
- 栏目:
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- 出版日期:
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2025-10-28
文章信息/Info
- Title:
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A Stake in the Soil Breeds Steadfastness: An Analysis of the Relationship Between Tenants’ Managerial Ability and Land Contract Choice in Republican China
- 作者:
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陈 苏
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（江西财经大学 经济学院，江西 南昌 330013）
- Author(s):
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CHEN Su
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（School of Economics, Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics, Nanchang 330013）
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- 关键词:
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经营能力; 土地合约; 农业阶梯; 卜凯农家数据
- Keywords:
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operating ability; land contract; agricultural ladder; Buck’s Household Data
- 分类号:
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S-09；K211
- 文献标志码:
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A
- 摘要:
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在传统的乡土社会中，土地租佃制度是实现佃农劳动、土地和资本得以卓有成效地运转的重要制度，其租佃形态逐渐由分成合约向定额合约转变，这种渐进式变迁的根源在于佃农能够通过掌握有助于实现其目标的技能、知识和信息，进而获得潜在收益。与分成合约相比，定额合约下土地所有权和经营权完全分离，佃农拥有完全剩余索取权，可获得全部额外收益。外在的约束条件不同使得土地合约安排方式不一样，在完全信息和确定性生产条件下，随着佃农经营能力的提高所带来的产量预期的增加，确保了土地收益的稳定性，土地租佃市场的一般均衡意味着定额合约对地主和佃农双方都有利。本文利用20世纪30年代卜凯农家调查资料整理得到的9省14县1276户数据，特征事实表明，随着佃农经营能力的提高，选择定额合约的佃农占比呈上升趋势，而选择分成合约的佃农占比呈下降趋势。实证分析表明，在确定性生产条件下，随着佃农经营能力的增强，土地合约更多地表现为定额合约。研究进一步分析表明，在定额合约下，佃农更可能扩大租入的土地规模。
- Abstract:
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In traditional agrarian society, the land-tenure system was a crucial institution that aligned labor, land, and capital so that they operated efficiently. Over time, tenancy arrangements gradually shifted from share contracts to fixed-rent contracts. This incremental transformation stemmed from tenants’ acquisition of the skills, knowledge, and information necessary to achieve their goals and thereby capture latent gains. Under a fixed-rent contract, ownership and management are fully separated: the tenant becomes the sole residual claimant and appropriates any surplus output. Because the external constraints facing landlords and tenants differ, the chosen contractual form varies. Under complete information and deterministic production, an increase in expected output driven by the tenant’s rising managerial ability stabilizes the landowner’s income. The resulting general equilibrium in the tenancy market implies that a fixed-rent contract is mutually advantageous. Using household-level data collected by John Lossing Buck in the 1930s—covering 1,276 farm households in fourteen counties across nine provinces—we document the following stylized fact: as tenants’ managerial ability improves, the share opting for fixed-rent contracts rises while the share choosing share contracts falls. Empirical analysis confirms that, under deterministic production conditions, stronger tenant ability makes fixed-rent contracts more likely. Further results show that, under fixed-rent terms, tenants tend to rent in larger plots of land.
更新日期/Last Update:
2025-11-27